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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : 
v. : 
ANDREW R. QUINTANA, : Case No. 880406-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Appellant/Petitioner. : 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Petition for Rehearing of an appeal from judgment and 
conviction for Burglary, a second degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1953 as amended), and Theft, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1953 as 
amended), following a jury trial held May 24-25, 1988, in the Third 
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
the Honorable Raymond S. Uno, Judge, presiding. Following briefing 
and oral argument, this Court issued its opinion in State v. 
Quintana on October 4, 1989, affirming the convictions. A copy of 
the Court's opinion is attached as Addendum A. 
INTRODUCTION 
This Petition for Rehearing is filed pursuant to Rule 35, 
Utah Rules of the Court of Appeals. In Brown v. Pickard, 11 P. 512 
(Utah 1886), the Utah Supreme Court established the standard for 
granting a petition for rehearing, stating: 
To justify a rehearing, a strong case must be 
made. We must be convinced that the court failed 
to consider some material point in the case, or 
that it erred in its conclusions . . . . 
Later, in Cummings v. Nielson, 129 P. 619, 624 (Utah 1913), the 
Supreme Court added: 
To make an application for a rehearing is a matter 
of right, and we have no desire to discourage the 
practice of filing petitions for rehearings in 
proper cases. When this court, however, has 
considered and decided all of the material 
questions involved in a case, a rehearing should 
not be applied for, unless we have misconstrued or 
overlooked some statute or decision which may 
affect the result, or that we have based the 
decision on some wrong principle of law, or have 
either misapplied or overlooked something which 
materially affects the result . . . If there are 
some reasons, however, such as we have indicated 
above, or other good reasons, a petition for a 
rehearing should be promptly filed and, if it is 
meritorious, its form will in no case be 
scrutinized by this court. 
In accordance with the above-noted principles, this Petition for 
Rehearing is properly before the Court and should be granted. In 
the opinion authored in State v. Quintana, No. 880406-CA (filed 
October 4, 1989), this Court misapprehended and misconstrued the law 
as it pertains to this case. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The prosecutor's comments in his opening statement to the 
jury violating the court order denied Mr. Quintana his rights to a 
fair trial under both the state and federal constitutions. A 
rehearing is warranted in this case because this Court (1) failed to 
distinguish opening statement misconduct from closing argument 
misconduct, (2) failed to address the prosecutor's violation of the 
court's pretrial order to suppress the identification, and 
(3) failed to properly apply the correct legal standard to the facts 
of this case. When this Court properly makes the above distinctions 
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and analyses, reversal of Mr. Quintana's convictions is warranted. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT. THE PROSECUTOR'S COMMENTS IN HIS OPENING 
STATEMENT VIOLATING THE COURT ORDER DENIED 
MR. QUINTANA HIS RIGHTS TO A FAIR TRIAL UNDER THE 
STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS. 
Prior to trial in this case, Mr. Quintana filed a motion 
to suppress the identification of him by one Calvin Dean Rains. The 
trial court granted that motion. 
However, during the State's opening statement, the 
prosecutor, despite the court order forbidding Mr. Rains to identify 
Mr. Quintana as the burglar, informed jurors that Mr. Rains saw 
Mr. Quintana come out of the alley behind the burglarized home. 
Mr. Quintana immediately moved for a mistrial. That motion was 
denied by the trial court. 
Mr. Quintana appealed to this Court claiming that the 
prosecutor's remarks denied him his right to a fair trial and 
required reversal of his convictions. 
The State responded conceding that the prosecutor's 
remarks were contrary to the order of the court and were erroneous. 
Brief of Respondent at 12. The State urged, however, that the error 
was harmless and did not prejudice Mr. Quintana. Id. 
This Court on review also found the prosecutor's opening 
statement comments to be highly improper and erroneous misconduct. 
Opinion at 6. Nonetheless, the Court found that the misconduct does 
not require reversal. Opinion at 6-7. 
This Court's opinion is ill based. The Court has 
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misapprehended both the law and the facts, misapplied the law to the 
facts, and overlooked critical subtleties in the law which require 
rehearing and reversal of Mr. Quintanafs convictions. 
Specifically, Mr. Quintana suggests that this Court 
failed in three critical analyses of this case: (1) failed to 
distinguish opening statement misconduct from closing argument 
misconduct, (2) failed to properly address the prosecutor's 
violation of the court's pretrial order, and (3) failed to apply the 
correct legal standard to the facts of the case. Individually and 
collectively, these errors require reversal of Mr. Quintana's 
convictions. 
A. THIS COURT FAILED TO DISTINGUISH OPENING 
STATEMENT MISCONDUCT FROM CLOSING ARGUMENT 
MISCONDUCT. 
This Court relies on State v. Thomas, 111 Utah Adv. Rep. 
24 (Utah 1989), and State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987), for 
its decision. Both cases, however, are not dispositive of: the case 
at bar, although they do reiterate the two-part test for determining 
whether a prosecutor's misconduct requires reversal. Nonetheless, 
both State v. Thomas and State v. Tillman, like so many other cases 
in this jurisdiction (see, e.g., State v. Rislow, 736 P.2d 637 (Utah 
1987); State v. Tucker, 727 P.2d 185 (Utah 1986); State v. Smith, 
700 P.2d 1106 (Utah 1985); and State v. Valdez, 513 P.2d 422 (Utah 
1973), involve closing argument misconduct/statements of 
prosecutors, not opening statement misconduct. Moreover, none of 
these cases involve the direct violation of court orders as 
occurring in the case at bar. 
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In his briefs to this Court, Mr. Quintana emphasized the 
distinction between opening and closing arguments. Mr. Quintana 
cited federal and state case law to support the violation of his 
right to a fair trial.1 See Brief of Appellant at 9-16. 
Mr. Quintana espoused the longstanding principle of 
jurisprudence that opening statements of prosecutors are confined to 
general recitals of what the State expects to prove, without, 
however, any reference to evidence which would not be admissible in 
trial. See Walker v. State, 624 P.2d 687 (Utah 1981); State v. 
Erwin, 120 P.2d 285 (Utah 1941); and State v. Distefano, 262 P. 113 
(Utah 1927) . 
More specifically, Mr. Quintana identified competent 
support that a difference exists between prosecutorial misconduct in 
opening statements and those which occur in closing arguments. The 
Eighth Circuit's opinion in United States v. Johnson, 767 F.2d 1259, 
1274 (8th Cir. 1985), reasons that prosecutorial misconduct "made 
during an opening statement makes it more egregious than a similar 
remark would be in a closing argument." The court further pointed 
out the distinction between the two is that improprieties during 
closing arguments can be excused as product of provocation while 
opening statements take place in a less volatile atmosphere and are 
1
 Because Mr. Quintana relied on both federal and state 
law which analytically rely on federal due process analysis—none of 
the cases note reliance on state due process—he believes the 
Courtfs footnote no. 2 at page 6 of the opinion is in error. 
However, Mr. Quintana also has urged that any harmless error 
analysis was improper. See subpoint B, infra. If, however, this 
Court disagrees, the federal standard should be evaluated as well. 
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presumed to be planned. Id. 
Additionally, Mr. Quintana relied on State v. Troy, 688 
P.2d 483 (Utah 1984). State v. Troy is a rare opinion among the 
many prosecutorial misconduct cases in this jurisdiction where 
opening statement comments were attacked as prejudicial misconduct. 
The Utah Supreme Court reversed the conviction in that case, 
particularly relying on the opening statement remarks.2 
This Court in its opinion failed to address the alleged 
distinctions between opening statement and closing argument 
misconduct. Accordingly, rehearing is mandated so that this Court 
may correct its error, address the issue, and reverse Mr. Quintana's 
convictions. 
B. THIS COURT FAILED TO ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE 
PROSECUTOR'S VIOLATION OF THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER. 
Perhaps even more disquieting than the error noted above 
is that this Court failed to address the question of the 
prosecutor's behavior in defiance of the court's pretrial order to 
the contrary. 
Applying a harmless error analysis to a prosecutor's 
direct violation of a court order is contrary to the ends of justice 
2
 Only one other case, State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 
1253-55 (Utah 1988), discusses alleged opening statement 
misconduct. That case involved a discrepancy between the facts 
proven and the opening statement proffer. The Court termed the 
discrepancy as "so slight that it was not error." Id. at 1254. 
Notably, the Lafferty case is readily distinguishable in any event 
because it did not involve the violation of a trial court's 
suppression order as occurred in the case at bar. 
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in this individual case as well as all other future cases.J In 
State v. Ubaldi, 462 A.2d 1001 (Conn. 1983), cert, denied, 464 U.S. 
916 (1983), the Connecticut Supreme Court explained its refusal to 
apply a harmless error analysis under similar circumstances: 
The ultimate implication of [the harmless error 
analysis] argument is that a state's attorney may 
choose deliberately to ignore any trial court 
ruling just as long as the state has amassed 
overwhelming evidence of a defendant's guilt and 
the state's attorney's misconduct relates only to 
a portion of that evidence. We decline to place 
such a restraint on the ability of this court to 
defend the integrity of the judicial system. 
Id. at 1007. 
The Ubaldi court recognized the remedies and rationales 
utilized in other jurisdictions on this issue and proffered the 
following: 
According to some authorities, the evil of 
overzealous prosecutors is more appropriately 
combatted through contempt sanctions, disciplinary 
boards or other means. This court, however, has 
long been of the view that it is ultimately 
responsible for the enforcement of court rules in 
prosecutorial misconduct cases. Upsetting a 
criminal conviction is a drastic step, but it is 
the only feasible deterrent to flagrant 
prosecutorial misconduct in defiance of a trial 
court ruling. 
Id. at 1009. The Ubaldi court then offerred an explanation of why 
this Court's opinion in State v. Quintana is incorrect and why it 
3 Mr. Quintana does not suggest by advancing this 
argument that the facts against him were overwhelming. Mr. Quintana 
continues to aver that the State's case against him was less than 
compelling and that the prosecutorial misconduct, when analyzed 
properly, demanded the mistrial motion be granted. See argument, 
subpoint C, infra. 
ill serves justice. That court noted: 
We are mindful of the sage admonition that 
appellate rebuke without reversal ignores the 
reality of the adversary system of justice. 'The 
deprecatory words we use in our opinions . . . are 
purely ceremonial.' Government counsel, employing 
such tactics, are the kind who, eager to win 
victories, will gladly pay the small price of a 
ritualistic verbal spanking. 'The practice [of 
verbal criticism without judicial action]— 
recalling the bitter tears shed by the walrus as 
he ate the oysters—breeds a deplorably cynical 
attitude towards the judiciary.' Moreover, 
' [deliberate prosecutorial misconduct is 
presumably infrequent; to invalidate convictions 
in the few cases where this is proved, even on a 
fairly low showing of materiality, will have a 
relatively small impact on the desired finality of 
judgments and will deter conduct undermining the 
integrity of the judicial system.' 
Id. (citations omitted; brackets by the court). 
Cases from the Utah Supreme Court support the view of the 
Connecticut Supreme Court. In State v. wiswelly 639 P.2d 146 (Utah 
1981), the prosecutor raised the appellant's failure to testify 
after the trial court repeatedly sustained objections to the 
admission of such evidence. After concluding that the prosecutor's 
conduct violated the appellant's right to remain silent, the Utah 
Supreme Court found reversible error, stating: 
The continued attempts by the prosecutor to put 
the defendant's silence before the jury after his 
having been advised of his right to remain silent 
amounts to prosecutorial misconduct. 
The references to defendant's silence are 
fundamental error, which could have affected the 
result and are therefore prejudicial. 
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In State v, Brown, 607 P.2d 261 (Utah 1980), a capital 
case, the trial court instructed an attorney witness that hearsay on 
hearsay evidence would not be permitted in the penalty phase because 
of its lack of probative value. Despite the trial court's ruling, 
the prosecutor and his attorney witness did not honor the ruling. 
Id. at 270. The Utah Supreme Court noted: 
We cannot say that the errors that occurred here 
were harmless. An inflammatory obscenity was 
inaccurately imputed to the defendant in the 
penalty phase, which arose from a violation of the 
District Court's order. 
Id. at 271. Because the error worked prejudice to the 
defendant—was not harmless—the Court reversed the sentence of 
death. Id. 
Other jurisdictions concur with the concept that 
violation of a court order to avoid prejudicing the case against the 
accused requires a reversal of the conviction. A Texas court has 
stated: 
When the court has ruled on a point, the same 
evidence should not again be offered in the 
presence of the jury . . . there is a duty upon 
the court to rule decisively. When error creeps 
into the record, the court should instruct the 
jury to disregard it. The judge must do more. He 
must enforce his rulings. Violations of a court's 
solemn rulings should "lead to serious 
consequences." 
Cody v. Mustang Oil Tool Co., 595 S.W.2d 214, 215 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1980). The Washington Supreme Court was even more direct: 
If we are persuaded that a prosecuting attorney or 
a witness for the state is deliberately trying to 
deprive the defendant of a fair trial, we will 
assume that he succeeded in his purpose and grant 
a new trial. It would seem that our frequent 
discussions of this subject could, within the near 
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future, serve to prevent the reference to a 
defendant as being on parole by all except the 
willful or the congenitally ignorant. 
State v. Nettleton, 400 P.2d 301, 303 n.4 (Wash. 1965). See also 
State v. Smith, 65 P.2d 1075 (Wash. 1937) (court reversed conviction 
because the prosecutor asked a question which at a motion in limine 
had been ruled improper by trial court). 
The case against Mr. Quintana involved the single issue 
of identification; all parties agreed on that point. The trial 
court found that the suggestive identification procedure utilized 
with Mr. Rains violated Mr. Quintana's due process rights and ruled 
that his identification must be suppressed. The identification was 
suppressed because its introduction, under the circumstances, would 
have prejudiced Mr. Quintana. Neither the State nor this Court took 
issue with the trial court's order suppressing the identification. 
It becomes difficult to understand how the suppressed identifica-
tion, when revealed to the jury by the prosecutor during his opening 
statement, is now cleansed of prejudice to Mr. Quintana. Because of 
the centrality of the issue of identification to this case and the 
violation of the trial court's order, much like the right to remain 
silent violation in State v. Wiswell and the hearsay upon hearsay 
violation of State v. Brown, the harmless error analysis is 
inappropriate. Mr. Quintana was prejudiced. His convictions should 
be reversed. 
C. THIS COURT FAILED TO APPLY THE CORRECT LEGAL 
STANDARD TO THE FACTS OF THE CASE. 
This Court opined that because the prosecutor made only 
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one illicit identification reference to the defendant—and that 
reference was very early in the two-day trial—that the error 
somehow becomes benign. Opinion at 5-6. The Court further suggests 
that compelling evidence otherwise cleansed the prosecutorial 
misconduct error. Both contentions are erroneous. 
In State v. Troy, a case heavily relied on by 
Mr. Quintana and unaddressed by this Court, the Utah Supreme Court 
stated the two-prong test for reversing a prosecutorial misconduct 
case as follows: 
The test of whether the remarks made by counsel 
are so objectionable as to merit a reversal in a 
criminal case is, (1) did the remarks call to the 
attention of jurors matters which they would not 
be justified in considering in determining their 
verdict, (2) and were they, under the 
circumstances of the particular case, probably 
influenced by those remarks. 
688 P.2d at 486 (citing, inter alia, State v. Valdez, 513 P.2d at 
426). A discussion of prong one of the test is unnecessary as all 
parties and even this Court agreed that prong was met. Opinion at 
6. In State v. Troy, the Utah Supreme Court offerred additional and 
very helpful information in analyzing prong two of this two-part 
test. The Court noted: 
Step two is more difficult [than step one] 
and involves a consideration of the circumstances 
of the case as a whole. In making such a 
consideration, it is appropriate to look at the 
evidence of defendant's guilt. 
If proof of defendant's guilt is strong the 
challenged conduct or remark will not be presumed 
prejudicial. Likewise in a case with less 
compelling proof, this court will more closely 
scrutinize the conduct. If the conclusion of the 
jurors is based on their weighing conflicting 
evidence or evidence susceptible of differing 
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interpretations, there is a greater likelihood 
that they will be improperly influenced through 
remarks of counsel. Indeed, in such cases, the 
jurors may be searching for guidance in weighing 
and interpreting the evidence. They may be 
especially susceptible to influence, and a small 
degree of influence may be sufficient to affect 
the verdict. 
Id, at 486 (emphasis added). 
Notably, the phrasing of prong two in State v. Troy is 
somewhat different than that recited by this Court from State v, 
Thomas, Nonetheless, the substance of prong two is the same. 
Critically important in the court's explanation of prong two in 
State v, Troy, however, is that no deference is to be given to the 
jury's verdict when analyzing a prosecutorial misconduct statement; 
rather, the more conflicting the evidence and/or the more 
susceptible the evidence is of differing interpretations, then the 
greater the likelihood of influence by the remarks or, as phrased in 
State v, Thomas, the more likely there would be a more favorable 
result for the defendant. 
The analysis under prong two of State v. Troy is 
distinctively different than that applied to a sufficiency of the 
evidence challenge. This Court properly deferred to the jury's 
verdict in responding to the insufficient evidence claim because 
when conducting that analysis, it is correct to assume the jury 
resolved the conflicts in the evidence in accordance with the 
verdict. By examining this Court's treatment of the insufficient 
evidence claim, the number of conflicts in the evidence in this case 
and their significance is displayed. This Court repeatedly 
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addressed the contradicting evidence by indicating that the jurors 
could have adopted the State's suggested inference or could have 
believed the State's witness(es) and disbelieved the defense 
witness(es). Opinion at 7-9. 
The Court's resolution of the insufficient evidence claim 
effectively demonstrates that the evidence against Mr. Quintana was 
conflicting and susceptible of differing interpretations. 
Accordingly, the Court should have applied State v. Troy's second 
prong recognizing that the prosecutor's comments were more than 
sufficient to influence jurors on how to resolve the conflicts. 
Because the Court failed to recognize the distinction between a 
State v. Troy analysis and an insufficiency of evidence claim, it 
did not correctly scrutinize the prosecutor's conduct. After all, 
the Troy court expressly noted that na small degree of influence may 
be sufficient to affect the verdict." 688 P.2d at 486. 
Mr. Quintana avers that the prosecutor's comments were 
much more than a small degree of improper influence. He believes 
the error to have been determinative and insists that this court 
misapprehended the facts of the case to the contrary. Particularly 
strained in this Court's opinion is the treatment given to the 
testimony and identification of Mr. Quintana by Mrs. Rains. 
Mr. Quintana especially challenges the Court's assessment that she 
supplied the identification evidence buttressed by Mr. Rains' 
"permissible testimony" that the man in the alley was the same man 
both of them saw on the porch moments earlier. Opinion at 6. 
The Court fails to address that the actual buttressing on 
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this point comes not from Mr. Rains but from the prosecutor who made 
the identification of Mr. Quintana as the culprit against the order 
of the court. Alone, the testimony of Mrs. Rains is uncompelling 
and questionable support for maintaining the convictions against 
Mr. Quintana. Even this Court recognized that Patricia Rains was 
not very articulate in describing the basis for her recognition of 
Mr. Quintana. Opinion at 7. While her testimony may not have been 
improbable, a reasonable jury would have required more than the 
information she provided to convict a man of these crimes beyond a 
reasonable doubt. They had more, the identification by the 
prosecutor in defiance of the court order. 
Mr. Quintana also complains that the critical information 
in Mrs. Rains1 testimony that she had supplied the name Andy or 
Andrew Quintana to the police officers during the initial report of 
the burglary is wholly unreliable. Both police officers who 
testified where unable to recall a particular first name supplied in 
any of the reports or broadcasts. That fact alone points out the 
unlikelihood that jurors would have relied heavily on her 
testimony. As all other evidence in this case was contradicted, the 
illicit identification "testimony" by the prosecutor resolved the 
issue for the jurors in favor of the convictions. 
Even assuming the jurors could have believed all of 
Mrs. Rains' testimony regarding Mr. Quintana, that evidence only 
placed him on the porch and in the truck. When Mr. Rains testified, 
the jurors made the connection to Mr. Quintana that was supplied to 
them during the opening statement by the prosecutor. Accordingly, 
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under either version of the second prong of State v. Troy or 
State v. Thomas, Mr. Quintana merits rehearing on this issue, 
reconsideration of his claims, and reversal of his convictions. 
CONCLUSION 
For all or any of the foregoing reasons, Appellant, 
Mr. Andrew Quintana, requests that this Court rehear his case and 
reverse his convictions. . 
Respectfully submitted this p*^ day of October, 1989 
[CHARD G. UDAY 
Attorney for Appellant/^e^itioner 
CERTIFICATION 
I, RICHARD G. UDAY, do hereby certify the following: 
(1) I am the attorney for the Petitioner in this case; 
(2) This Petition for Rehearing is presented to this 
Court in good faith and not to delay any matter in this case. 
Respectfully submitted this <^f>> 
Attorney for Appellant/Peti/tioner 
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ADDENDUM A 
OPINION 
(Not For Publication) 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Andrew R. Quintana, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No.•880406-CA 
F i L r -) 
*<b'*:\ c: :r,e Court 
t&n Court sfApjsj!: Third District, Salt Lake County ^C0Grt*MW: 
The Honorable Raymond S. Uno 
Attorneys: Lynn R. Brown and Richard G. Uday, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellant 
R. Paul Van Dam and Charlene Barlow, Salt Lake 
City, for Respondent 
Before Judges Garff, Jackson, and Bullock.1 
JACKSON, Judge: 
Defendant Andrew R. Quintana appeals from the judgment and 
conviction of burglary and theft entered on a jury verdict. We 
affirm. 
According to the evidence presented at trial, the Ted John 
family returned to their Salt Lake County home on Emery Street 
from a two-day trip in the early evening of September 27, 1987. 
A note on their door informed them that the home had been 
burglarized and asked them to contact the police. After, 
inventorying their belongings, Ted John reported that a vacuum 
cleaner worth $100 and stereo equipment worth $800 were missing. 
The vacuum cleaner was 3-4' high and 14-18" across at the base. 
The stereo equipment consisted of patch cords and three 
1. J. Robert Bullock, Senior District Judge, sitting by special 
appointment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-24(1) (j) (1987). 
Yamaha components, including an amplifier and cassette player 
(each measuring 14" wide by 6" tall by 10" deep and weighing 
10-15 lbs. and 4 lbs., respectively) and a tuner (measuring 14n 
by 3** by 10- and weighing 2 lbs.). 
At approximately 11:30 the same morning, Patricia Rains, a 
neighbor who lived across the street from the Johns, was 
returning from the grocery store. As she turned onto her street, 
she noticed a burgundy Mazda pickup truck parked on the street 
and a man in a tank top and colorful Bermuda shorts looking at 
her from the porch of the Johns* home, approximately 30* away. 
In the course of unloading her groceries from her car, she saw 
the individual knock on the Johns* front door, wait for an 
answer, look in the picture window, and open the mailbox lid. 
Once inside her apartment, she continued to watch the man through 
her front bay window, approximately 85-100* from the Johns* front 
porch, along with her husband, Calvin Dean Rains. She saw the 
man walk off the porch and over to the burgundy truck. 
Calvin Dean Rains testified that, while looking out his 
apartment window for his wife on the morning of September 27, 
1987, he saw a man in a late-model, dark maroon Mazda or Nissan 
pickup truck, with lowered suspension and a broken front grille 
on the driver's side, park down the street from the Johns* home 
and walk up their driveway. The man was Spanish or Mexican, 
approximately 5*6- or 5*7- tall, in his mid-20*s, with black 
semi-wavy hair. He wore multicolor Bermuda shorts and a baggy 
T-shirt with sleeves and an emblem on one side. The man went 
onto the porch, looked in the window, looked in the mailbox, 
opened the screen door, and tried the knob on the front door. He 
then returned to the truck and backed it down the street and 
around the corner out of sight. 
A few minutes later, Calvin Dean Rains went to his truck to 
return to the grocery store for some forgotten items. He pulled 
around the corner and spotted the same maroon pickup truck parked 
across from the alley that ran behind the Johns* home. 
Suspicious, he did a U-turn and stopped his own truck near the 
alleyway and waited a few minutes. From 75 or 80 yards away, he 
saw the man who had been on the front porch come out of the 
alleyway. When the man saw Rains, he immediately turned around 
and began walking in the opposite direction. After taking 
several steps, the man again turned around completely and walked 
directly to the burgundy Mazda. He looked like he was carrying 
something under his shirt because he had a large bulge under the 
left side of his baggy shirt that was supported by his arm. The 
man got into the pickup and, after a few moments, drove away past 
Rains. 
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Rains returned to his home and told his wife that someone 
had been robbed. They then went with another neighbor to the 
back of the Johns' home, where they found an open window and door 
and a screen on the grass. The tall weeds near the four foot 
high picket fence that separates the Johns' property from the 
alleyway had been trampled down, making it appear that someone 
had walked through them and climbed over the fence. They 
returned to their home and Patricia Rains called the police, 
providing a description of the man and the truck, the name Andy 
Quintana, and the license number 5600AK, which Calvin Rains had 
remembered and written down on a piece of paper. 
A police dispatch was sent out at about noon concerning a 
burglary at the John residence. The suspect was described as a 
male Hispanic with dark hair, approximately 5'7" and 130 lbs. 
The vehicle was described as a maroon Mazda pickup, license 
number 5600AK, with chrome trim and damage to the grille area. 
The officer who responded to the dispatch did not recall being 
given the name of the man seen at the Johns' residence. 
When Officer Robert Robinson came on duty that afternoon, 
his supervisor told him of the burglary and gave him the vehicle 
description, the probable license plate number, and a description 
of the suspect as a short, male Hispanic in his twenties, wearing 
a shirt and shorts. He was also told that the suspect vehicle 
belonged to wthe Quintanas," but he did not recall being given a 
first name. At 3:00 that afternoon, Officer Robinson stopped a 
truck fitting the description, but with license number 3600AK. 
The driver, who identified himself as Andrew R. Quintana, was 
wearing a blue pullover shirt and grey Bermuda shorts. Robinson 
checked the registration of the pickup and found that it was 
registered in the name of Jack N. Quintana, defendant's brother. 
The officer stated the reason for the stop. Defendant explained 
that he and the truck had been at his home all morning, a few 
blocks from where he was stopped, until he went to his sister's 
on Shannon Circle at about 2:00 p.m. to help move a washing 
machine. As the officer continued his questioning, defendant 
altered his story somewhat. When Robinson asked him if the 
pickup had been on Emery Street, defendant said that he had a 
sister, Irene, who lived on that street, but denied being there 
that day. Then he mentioned that he had helped a sister in the 
morning. By the end of the conversation with Officer Robinson, 
however, defendant had reverted to claiming he was at his own 
home all morning and had helped his sister on Shannon Circle in 
the afternoon, Robinson decided to impound the pickup and the 
patch cords he saw on the passenger's seat of the pickup, and 
defendant left on foot. 
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Defendant's sister, Gerline, testified that defendant had 
come to her home on Shannon Circle on either Saturday, September 
27, or Sunday, September 28, at about 1:45 p.m. to help move her 
washer and dryer. He was wearing grey shorts and a T-shirt. He 
was alone in the the maroon Mazda pickup, which she described as 
riding low to the ground. Defendant's mother testified that 
defendant lives with her and that she washes his clothing. She 
stated that defendant did not have any Bermuda shorts with 
multiple colors or any shorts that came down to his knees and no 
bulky tank tops or T-shirts with emblems or writing on them. 
When she and her husband left their home on September 27 at 10:15 
a.m., defendant was asleep; he was, as far as she knew, also 
asleep when they returned at about 11:45 a.m. She also verified 
that defendant has a sister, Irene, who lives around the corner 
from the Johns' residence, but on Illinois Avenue, not Emery 
Street. 
Jack Quintana testified that he owned the maroon and chrome 
Mazda pickup, which rides low in the back and is missing a front 
grille, in which defendant was stopped. He identified the patch 
cords introduced by the State as his own, explaining that he uses 
them to connect a portable amplifier, which was introduced at 
trial, to his cassette player in the truck and to his stereo in 
his home. He had last seen the patch cords at the bottom of the 
truck seat on September 11, 1987, the day he was incarcerated as 
a result of a theft conviction that month. Finally, an 
investigator testified that the defendant is 5'4-3/4" tall in 
sneakers. 
I. 
At trial, Patricia Rains identified the man she saw on the 
Johns' porch as the defendant, asserting that she recognized him 
as Andy Quintana as soon as she saw him there and that she 
recognized the truck he was driving. She stated that she 
provided the police with his name when she called them.. When 
asked on cross-examination how she knew defendant, she said that 
she had never met him, but knew of him, and asserted that he 
might have been to her home with her little sister, although she 
was not sure. In response to defense counsel's question about 
when the last time was that she had seen him prior to seeing him 
at the Johns' residence, she confusingly responded, "Two or three 
days ago.- When pressed on redirect to explain how she put the 
name Andy Quintana on the face she saw on September 27, she 
stated that she was familiar with the face because she had seen 
him around. She suggested that he had been pointed out to her on 
the street and named by her sisters. She claimed that she had 
seen him several times before September 27. 
880406-CA 4 
During the investigation of the John burglary, Calvin Dean 
Rains was called to the police station to see if he could 
identify a suspect in the crime. Defendant was brought into a 
room by a police officer and walked past the desk at which Rains 
was sitting. Rains identified defendant as the man he had seen 
at the Johns residence on September 27. Because of the highly 
suggestive nature of this identification process, the trial court 
granted defendant's pretrial motion to suppress and issued an 
order prohibiting the State from using the testimony of Calvin 
Dean Rains to identify Andrew Quintana. 
During the course of his opening statement to the jury, the 
prosecutor, Ernest Jones, told the jury of the Rainses' 
observations of a man on the Johns* porch and that Patricia Rains 
had told the police that she knew who the man was, i.e., the 
defendant Andrew Quintana. The prosecutor then stated, "Well, 
Mr. and Mrs. Rains watched the defendant" and went on to decribe 
the man's movements on the porch and Mr. Rains's subsequent 
actions in getting into his own truck and eventually parking by 
the alleyway after seeing the maroon Mazda parked there. The 
prosecutor continued: "And he said that the defendant was out of 
sight. He didn't know exactly where the defendant had gone, but 
essentially he said he saw him come out." 
Defense counsel objected at this point, and a conference was 
held at the bench. When Jones continued his opening statement, 
he referred to the person seen by Rains coming out of the 
alleyway as "the man," not as "the defendant." At the close of 
the prosecutor's opening remarks, the jury was excused and 
defendant moved for a mistrial, asserting that the State had just 
accomplished an identification of the defendant by Mr. Rains 
through the prosecutor's statement that it was prohibited by 
court order from introducing through Mr. Rains's direct testimony. 
On appeal, Quintana contends that the prosecutor's remarks 
during opening statement constituted misconduct requiring 
reversal of his conviction and remand for a new trial. The Utah 
Supreme Court has recently reiterated that a prosecutor's actions 
or remarks constitute misconduct meriting reversal if 
(1) the actions or remarks call to the 
attention of the jurors matters they would 
not be justified in considering in 
determining their verdict and (2) under 
the circumstances of the particular case, 
the error is substantial and prejudicial 
such that there is a reasonable likelihood 
that in its absence there would have been 
a more favorable result for the defendant. 
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State v. Thomas, 111 Utah Adv. Rep. 24, 25 (1989); accord State 
v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 555 (Utah 1987).2 
There is. no question that the prosecutor's statements 
concerning Mr. Rains's observations of defendant, quoted above, 
were highly improper in light of the court's pretrial order 
prohibiting the State from using any identification testimony 
by Mr. Rains. Thus, the first part of the test set forth in 
State v. Thomas is satisfied. However, although we do not 
condone the prosecutor's misconduct in this case, we conclude 
that his remarks did not substantially prejudice defendant 
under the circumstances. 
The improper remarks to the jury occurred in the first few 
minutes of this two-day trial. The prosecutor began his 
opening statement by telling the jury that the comments of 
attorneys during opening statements are not evidence. When he 
reached the point of describing how the Rainses watched a man 
on the Johns' front porch, he said that Patricia Rains told the 
police she knew the man was Andrew Quintana. The prosecutor 
then made the improper, but isolated, remarks about Mr. Rains 
seeing the defendant. After defendant's objection and the 
conference at the bench, the prosecutor restricted his 
references to Hthe man" in describing what Calvin Dean Rains 
saw and said. When defense counsel proceeded with his own 
opening statement, he again cautioned the jury that what the 
attorneys say is not evidence. During his subsequent 
testimony, Calvin Dean Rains described only what he observed 
and made no attempt to testify that the man he saw at the 
Johns' residence was, in fact, defendant. He did give 
permissible testimony that the man he saw on the front porch of 
the Johns' home was the same man he saw come out of the 
alleyway behind their home several minutes later with a large 
bulge under his baggy shirt. It was Patricia Rains who 
identified defendant for the jury as the man she saw on the 
Johns' porch and who testified that she recognized him on the 
day of the burglary because his face was familiar to her. 
Although these surrounding circumstances and all the 
evidence presented at trial do not excuse the prosecutor's 
misconduct, they convince us that his remarks did not taint the 
2. Defendant does not contend that the prosecutor's remarks 
resulted in error amounting to a violation of his federal 
constitutional rights. Such errors require reversal unless 
they are harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Tuttle. 
106 Utah Adv. Rep. 6, 12 (1989). 
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proceedings to the extent that, if they had not occurred, there 
is any reasonable likelihood that the jury would have decided 
the case differently. See State v. Mitchell, 116 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 3, 6 (1989). 
II. 
Quintana next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support his conviction for the burglary and theft at the Johns* 
residence. Specifically, he contends that there is 
insufficient evidence to identify him as the person who 
committed the crimes or to connect him with any of the property 
stolen from the Johns. 
In considering such a claim, we view the evidence presented 
and all inferences that can be drawn therefrom in the light 
most favorable to the jury's verdict. State v. Gardner. 101 
Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 10 (1989). This court will reverse a jury 
conviction only when the evidence, viewed in this light, "'is 
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted.1M 
State v. Cobb, 774 P.2d 1123, 1128 (Utah 1989) (quoting State 
v. Marcum, 750 P.2d 599, 601 (Utah 1988)). 
We reject Quintana's attack on Patricia Rains's 
identification of him as "inherently unreliable." She saw the 
man on the Johns' porch from only 30' away as she turned into 
her driveway, and she watched his actions from her driveway for 
several minutes. It is insignificant that Patricia Rains 
described the man as being just over an inch taller than 
defendant is in sneakers. It is equally uncompelling that, 
although she described the man as wearing bright, multicolored 
Bermuda shorts, defendant was stopped three hours later wearing 
grey shorts. He had ample opportunity and reason to change 
clothes in the interim. The jury did not have to believe his 
mother's testimony that he does not own the type of shorts 
described by the Rainses. 
In addition to Patricia Rains's in-court identification, 
the jury could also consider her testimony that she recognized 
the man on the porch as Andy Quintana as soon as she saw him 
there. She made it clear that she had seen him several times 
in her neighborhood before September 27, 1987, and that 
defendant had been pointed out to her and named by one of her 
sisters. The likelihood of such an occurrence was highlighted 
by the testimony of defendant's mother that one of his sisters 
lived very near the Rainses. Although Patricia Rains was not 
very articulate in describing the basis for her recogition of 
defendant that day, her testimony was neither inconclusive nor 
improbable. 
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There is also sufficient evidence in the record from which 
the jury could find that defendant obtained or exercised 
unauthorized control over the Johns1 property• A vacuum 
cleaner, three stereo components, and patch cords were 
missing. The three components, if stacked, measured 14 M wide 
by 10M deep by 15" tall and weighed, at most, 21 lbs. The 
witnesses testified about the physical condition of the home 
and yard, from which it could be inferred that someone had 
broken into the house through the rear window, taken the Johns' 
property, left through the back door, walked through the weeds, 
and vaulted the picket fence, described by Ted John as being as 
tall or a little shorter than the courtroom railing.3 The 
man whom Calvin Dean Rains had initially seen on the front 
porch, identified as defendant by Rains's wife, emerged from 
the alley behind the Johns' home a short time later with a 
large bulge under his shirt that could have been the stereo 
equipment. He acted suspiciously by changing directions after 
seeing Rains watching him and then promptly changing directions 
again. 
Defendant was later stopped in a truck substantially 
matching the Rainses' description, including all but one number 
in the license plate, with patch cords on the front seat. Ted 
John described these cords as similar to his own, although he 
could not positively identify them as his. Even without such a 
positive identification of the patch cords by Ted John, and 
even if the jury found that the patch cords introduced at trial 
belonged to defendant's brother, there was ample evidence from 
which the jury could find all the elements of theft as set 
forth in Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1978). 
Quintana's other two issues on appeal involve Jury 
Instruction 19, given over defendant's timely objections: 
Possession of recently stolen 
property, if not satisfactorily explained, 
is ordinarily a circumstance from which 
3. Ted John also described a gate in the fence, but the 
location of that gate in relation to the Johns' fence or the 
alley is unclear. The diagram to which he referred during his 
testimony, although introduced by the State at trial, is not in 
the record on appeal. 
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you may reasonably draw the inference and 
find/ in light of the surrounding 
circumstances shown by the evidence of the 
case, that the person in possession knew 
the property had been stolen. 
Thus if you find from the evidence 
and beyond a reasonable doubt, that the 
defendant was in possession of stolen 
property, that such possession was not too 
remote in point of time from the theft, 
and the defendant made no satisfactory 
explanation of such possession, then you 
may infer from those facts that the 
defendant committed the theft. 
You may use the same inference, if 
you find it justified by the evidence, to 
connect the possessor of recently stolen 
property with the offense of burglary. 
Quintana contends that the trial court erred by giving this 
instruction because there is no factual basis in the record to 
support it. See State v. Howland, 761 P.2d 579, 580 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988). He bases this argument on Ted John's failure to 
testify that the patch cords taken from the impounded truck 
were his patch cords. We believe there is adequate evidence in 
the record to support this instruction. In light of Ted John's 
identification of the cords as similar to his and the other 
testimony regarding the identification of defendant and his 
truck at the Johns' residence a few hours before he was 
stopped, there was evidence from which the jury could have 
concluded that the patch cords seized were, in fact, those 
stolen from the Johns. The jury was free to disbelieve Jack 
Quintana's testimony that the patch cords in evidence were his. 
Finally, defendant asserts that Instruction 19 violated his 
state and federal constitutional rights to due process because 
it created an irrebuttable presumption relieving the State of 
its burden of proving him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We 
conclude that this issue is completely meritless. Instruction 
19 does not use the -prima facie evidence" language in Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-402(1) (1978), which was held to create an 
unconstitutional irrebuttable presumption in State v. Chambers. 
709 P.2d 321, 326 (Utah 1985). The first paragraph of 
Instruction 19 does not create an irrebuttable presumption that 
the person who is inexplicably in possession of stolen property 
stole that property. Like the instruction held not to be 
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constitutionally defective in St;ate v. Johnson. 745 P.2d 452 
(Utah 1987)/ Instruction 19 simply allowed the jury to infer/ 
if it found that the defendant was in possession of stolen 
property without satisfactory explanation/ that he stole such 
property. Such an inference is not constitutionally 
impermissible. I£. at 456; State v. Graves, 717 P.2d 717 (Utah 
1986). 
Affirmed. 
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